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I did not grow up in Kentucky, but I spent a good deal of time as a boy visiting my
grandparents in Green County; so I am somewhat familiar with Kentucky. In my
observations over the past I didn't find a great deal of difference in Kentucky and
Tennessee. Geographically, they lie in the same area, and I think the ways that the
two departments of transportation work in very similar ways. The problems of the
counties and cities on the local level for both states are very similar. With Tennessee
and Kentucky, either the counties will have very little money or will be very rich and
able to attend to their own needs. This leads me to the subject ofmy discussion today.
On December 15, 1967, there was a major bridge disaster that occurred over the
Ohio River. This disaster took the lives of forty-six men, women, and childern. I
think for the most part over the country up until that time, people had been rather
complacent about their bridges. Probably more so than they had been about their
highways. In the late 20's and early 30's in Tennessee, we had a major bridge
building program. We built bridges over all of our major rivers, on our major
highways. Then, the bridges were shuttled off to the side. We began to try to connect
those bridges with highways. Although those bridges became old and deteriorated in
time, we didn't put a whole lot of money into maintenance probably a little bit like
Kentucky. We were putting most of our money into new construction.
I believe this scenario probably reflected what was going on across the nation. And
so with this disaster, it suddenly woke everybody up in the engineering profession
that maybe there is a ticking bomb out there somewhere. It caused Congress to take
some action to determine what the problem was all about. They passed legislation
requiring each one of the states to inventory their bridges on the Federal Aid System.
Each one of the states then began scurrying around as fast as they could to get this
implemented, and eventually a satisfactory inventory was produced.
Along with this proposition to inventory the bridges came some very limited
funding to replace bridges, but it was a drop in the bucket. By 1978, we had
completed our inventory offederal-aid bridges. It became apparent by looking at the
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Federal Aid Inventory and also samplings of the Off Systems across the country, that
the problem was immense. The problems with the Federal Aid System were nothing
in comparison with the problems of the Off System. Congress passed some further
legislation in 1978 to require all of the bridges on public roads in the United States to
be inspected. This was carried out somewhat differently across the nation, but in all
states it was done.
The Tennessee Department of Transportation did undertake the inspection of all
bridges across the state. I believe this is the way that Kentucky did it. Typically
what we found on the Off System was that the bridges were of short spans, moderate
in length, and low in traffic. Most were in very bad condition. Many had never been
designed as proper bridges in the first place.
When we finished our inventory of the Off System, we found that Tennessee had
18,000 bridges on the total transportation system. Of this, there were some 6,266
which were posted, and 1,122 that were closed. Roughly 5,700 of the 6,200 posted
bridges lay on the Off System. Virtually every one of the closed bridges lay on the Off
System. As I indicated, Tennessee had a little bit of a problem on the Federal Aid
System. Tennessee had an immense problem with the county and city bridges.
Tennessee had already decided to put the maximum funding that was possible on the
Off System. The Federal Aid Legislation required states to put sixty-five percent of
the funding on the Federal Aid System, and fifteen percent on the Off System with
twenty percent of their funding as discretionary money. Tennessee put the extra
twenty percent on the Off System, which amounted to thirty-five percent of their
federal funds.
In reviewing the costs that we were experiencing in trying to replace a bridge
under the Federal Bridge Replacement Program, we estimated that it would take us
some forty years just to address the bad bridges that were in the inventory in 1978.
This did not take into account any bridges that would go bad after 1978. Tennessee
concluded from its analysis of her problems that typically it would take somewhere in
the neighborhood of eighteen to twenty-four months to plan, survey, design, let the
contract, and get a bridge built on the Federal Aid System. On the average these
bridges were costing Tennessee around $250,000. Tennessee had some program of
involvement with her local governments where the state and local governments
contracted to do some work. When this was done, it was done in accordance with
state and local government procedures, and the law. We found that when we did work
this way we could get work completed on the average of less than twelve months.
Also, a bridge would cost us something less than $50,000. With this idea in mind we
felt like there might be a better way of going about our situation on the Off System
than just trying to address it with Federal Aid Funds. The bottom line of both
particular situations was that when we finished we had done both projects in
accordance with AASHTO and state specifications, ending up with identical
structures. Each one had the same load-carrying capacity and would serve the public
in the same manner.
Thus, Tennessee put together a program to accelerate the replacement of Off
System bridges. The first thing accomplished was the development of a set of project
specifications that would serve all local governments. Tennessee wanted the design
to be identical with the AASHTO standard specification for highway bridges. This
way Tennessee would ensure that the bridges under this program would be the same
as those under any other program. The construction specifications would be in
accordance with state standard specifications, and this again would make them the
same as any bridge. Tennessee wanted to design them in accordance with a live
loading ofHS20-44, and this is the heaviest live loading that's in the AASHTO bridge
specifications.
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Next, Tennessee developed a hydraulic design criteria that dealt with the type of
bridge Tennessee was dealing in -- a little bridge that might typically be located on a
gravel road, or some sort of country road, in which the approaches were not built to be
above high water. Tennessee decided that a ten-year flood frequency might be
appropriate for trying to design these bridges by a minimum proposition. We
designed them for over topping of their approaches, and this allowed us to build
bridges without putting an inordinate amount of money into the approaches. We set
out the methods in which the hydraulic information would be calculated, and this was
in accordance with what we were doing in the Division of Structures in Tennessee.
Tennessee then sent out a statement to the following regulating bodies: FEMA, TVA,
Corps of Engineers, and local governments. The statement implied that any
standards that these people or regulations had would have to be met. We left that up
to the local government. We didn't address that from a state level.
Another issue that Tennessee was concerned with was that all bridges should have
a minimum life expectancy of fifty years. In Tennessee, the bridges in the west
Tennessee area were mainly timber bridges. It was these timber bridges for the most
part that were bad. If you built a timber bridge in accordance with modem day
timber standards using the proper type of timber recommended for bridge
construction a bridge might last fifty years. I haven't run across a fifty year timber
bridge in Tennessee, and I haven't seen one in Kentucky. Normally the construction
method is to utilize something less than that. A lot of times in Tennessee it was just
timber that had no preservative treatment whatsoever, straight from the sawmill.
We felt like ifwe were going to put money in this program, we wanted bridges that
would last. We certainly didn't want something that next year would be inspected
and then load posted. Thus, Tennessee decided to make a statement that the bridge
type should be of a kind that is expected to have a fifty-year life. This dictated that
the bridges would be out of concrete and steel. I said earlier that you could build a
good timber bridge. When bridges are built out of timber materials, and with the
proper construction, they're generally not competitive with concrete and steel. We
indicated that we would cooperate with this program in every manner possible.
Providing the state standards that we had available as far as structures helped to
lessen the expense.
Another major issue that we considered was the requirement that all bridges have
a minimum bridge width of twenty-two feet. At that time, there were possibilities of
using wider bridges on a Federal program. However, in reviewing the Federal
standards and reviewing our own standards, we felt that we could justify this. We
went to the Federal Highway Administration and ultimately got their concurrence in
using a minimum bridge width of twenty-two feet. On most of the Off System bridges
in Tennessee this particular width is the one that governs. The next step in our
process was to go to our legislature and seek some enabling legislation.
The first program we dealt with concerned bridges that had load ratings less than
ten tons. We had a tremendous number of bridges that school buses could not cross.
We wanted to deal with those first. We put into law that we could not replace bridges
that carried weight limits over ten tons. We wanted to get the biggest bang for our
dollar. We put into law that we would be dealing with bridges that were less than
fifty feet in length. The bridges over fifty feet in length were dealt with on the
Federal program. We wanted to deal with bridges that had low traffic counts. We
talked about an average ADT of seven-fifty or less. We indicated how we would
apportion the money to each of the counties. We apportioned this money directly on
the basis of the number of deficient bridges that they had falling into these categories,
divided by the total number of deficient bridges that fell in these categories for the
entire state, utilizing the square feet of each one of those bridges. We indicated that
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the first order of business was going to deal with those bridges that were closed.
Bridges closed to traffic are much worse than a posted bridge.
Another part of the proposition was that Tennessee was going to deal on the same
basis with locals that we were dealing with the Federal program. The feds had the
80/20 basis. The local governments would need to put up twenty percent of the
proposed expenditure. A key feature of this is that the required match could be
provided as an in-kind contribution to the project. This meant that the local
governments did not have to put up hard cash. Another issue we wanted to resolve
with the local governments in Tennessee concerned fairness. The locals were going
out and fixing the bridges. We did not want to penalize them for having attempted to
do a good job. We put into our legislation that we would give credit towards matching
requirements for those counties that had taken bridges found to be deficient in the
initial inventory and repaired and replaced them with a minimum load limit of fifteen
tons. That way a county that had been responsive to their needs would not be
penalized by our program. We put all of this together and got it passed through the
legislature in Nashville. We came out with a proposition that was a contract between
the state and the local governments, whereby the state and local governments could
replace the bridges that they could best construct.
With the 80/20 program, Tennessee attempted to maximize the savings and other
benefits of both state and local governments with bridge construction. The state had
the responsibility of supplying the bulk of the funding. The state was good at raising
money. We felt we were the experts in the bridge game, so we were going to set the
specifications for the projects. We approved the plans and then performed the final
inspections to ensure that the structures had been built in accordance with the proper
requirements. We saved an awful lot of money. We let the local governments do the
things we felt they could do very well. We asked them to obtain professional
engineering services. We wanted all of these bridges designed by licensed
professional engineers. These engineers would prepare the plans for the counties, let
the bridges to contract for the counties, and/or cities, and then supervise the
construction.
Another great money-saving feature of the 80/20 program was that we asked the
counties to obtain the rights-of-way. When the State of Tennessee went out to obtain
a right-of-way, the state told the individual that he could obtain full market value for
his property ifhe so desired. We had found out that when the local governments
obtain rights-of-way for their roads, they explained to the property owner what type of
road improvement would occur in front of their land if they would just help the local
government by donating a little strip ofland on each side of the road so the
improvement could come about. In most instances, the local property owners were
very glad and willing to help out and participate. By letting the local governments
obtain the rights-of-way, we were able to obtain the rights-of-way almost cost free for
the bridge improvements. We also felt that the local governments could relocate
utilities more efficiently than the state could. The utility companies generally were
operating at the local level, and that's where the contacts were. The locals could get
this job done much better than the state. Also, most of the local governments in
Tennessee have their own highway departments. They have equipment and are able
to do a moderate amount of work. We felt that these local governments could
construct their own approaches to the small bridges, and thereby save a good deal of
money.
Putting together all of these things that the local government could do better than
the state, putting up funds, engineering services, building approaches to the bridges,
saved the taxpayers money and time. We would give locals either direct credit for the
funds that they expended or credit for the work they had done towards meeting their
twenty percent match. For the most part, the out-of-pocket expenditures that the
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local governments had to make were for procuring engineering services. They could
come up with the rest by some other means. We gave credit for the worth of any
right-of-way that was donated. We hit the ground running on this program.
In Tennessee during this 80/20 program, I served as head of the Division of
Structures. I had most of the elements in the Division of Structures for implementing
the program from the state level, and therefore had pretty much control of the process
myself. Between July 1, 1982, and November 1, 1984, we were able to replace 1,453
structurally deficient bridges on Tennessee's Off System. We replaced those for a
total cost of $50 million, which averaged somewhere in the neighborhood of $34,000
per structure. Most of these were surveyed, designed, contracted, constructed, and
inspected in less than twelve months. With such a large program the average costs of
the structures came in lower than what I expected. We actually did this program in
four phases. In phase three and phase four Tennessee pumped another $10 million
into the 80/20 over the next two years. During the two years, we replaced another 280
bridges in one year and about 24 7 in the next.
Since Tennessee was making great strides towards reducing our problem on the
Off System, we felt it would be unfair for us not to receive the monies that we would
ordinarily have coming to us to replace these bridges at the Federal level. We asked
our Congressional delegation to pass legislation to help us get the Federal monies
Tennessee deserved. We wanted any project for the replacement or revitalization of
bridges, and which was wholly funded from state and local sources in the State of
Tennessee to be eligible for Federal funds . Another key provision was that if the
bridges were constructed in accordance with all standards, and the key word is
standards, then of all funds expended by Tennessee after July 1, 1982, 80% could be
used as a match towards our Federal program. This meant 80% of the money that
was expended on this State 80/20 Program was built up into a little pool. Over a
period of several years we built our Federal System with 100% Federal funds.
Observers might say we got the use of our money twice. We enabled the Federal
Highway Administration to renew maybe four or five times as many bridges from our
inventory as would ordinarily have been possible under the Federal program, and
Tennessee was not penalized.
What we call the Demonstration Program has been successful and somewhat
evangelic in Tennessee. We want to let all of the other states have an opportunity to
do this same thing. The major requirement is that the bridges be certified by the
state to be carried out in accordance with all standards applicable to such projects
under Section 144 and that the bridges are no longer deficient bridges. If this is the
case, a state can gain credit for those programs against their Federal program.
In order for Tennessee to receive credit for these bridges, it was a required the
bridge inspection teams do a hands-on detailed inspection of all of the bridges. Next, I
had to certify that the bridges had been constructed in accordance with the
appropriate national and state standards, that they were no longer deficient bridges,
and had been taken off the deficient bridge list. In order to ensure that we were
doing the job correctly, the Federal Highway Administration went around with our
people on a sampling basis to ensure that everything was correct. When that was
done they were very pleased and satisfied that the program had been successful. This
program has resulted in some other spin-off rewards.
Sometimes the local governments in Tennessee, due to pressure from their citizens,
or lack of funding, were not able to be responsive to our request to post or close
bridges. In most cases they would post or close a bridge and the sign would only
remain overnight. It would somehow disappear. Even when we would pile up large
stacks ofrock or logs, they would seem to be able to move off into the night. It was a
difficult situation. To get the counties to be more responsive to this program, we
would get them to repair or repost some of their structures. We developed a priority
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replacement list for each county with our closed structures ranking first. Then if a
local government desired to skip over one of those structures, they were required to
demonstrate to us that they had brought that structure up to a minimum often tons
by their own means . This way we got a little more bang out of what we were doing.
It prompted the local governments to repair a few bridges they would not ordinarily
have done. This enabled us to reach bridges that were higher on the list.
As far as Tennessee is concerned, this is probably one of the most successful
programs we've ever had. The program was able to use taxpayers' money to deliver
cost-effective products that serve the public in a time of need. The program addressed
a problem in the best manner that Tennessee could.
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